

Prophet vs. Politician: Evaluating the Role of Charismatic Leadership in the Promotion of
Political Stability

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For thousands of years pharaohs, caesars and kings have monopolized political power. Such regimes never sought to engage the masses in political processes, but nonetheless, were stable regimes, accepted by the majority of citizens as natural and lawful. However, the modern global system increasingly demands both political and economic modernization as criteria for nation-state participation in the global economy. Western ideas of democracy and free market economics dominate the current world order. The United Nations, as the central organizational structure in global development, defines developmental progress by five criteria” “economic growth, equity, stability, democracy and human rights” (Palmer 52). Informational exchange, an outgrowth of globalization, economic development and mass education have all been factors contributing to the modern development of mass demand for political participation.

National leaders that do not respond to such demands for mass participation face great opposition not only from their population, but also from the global community. Political regimes that would be

considered stable during the previous periods of history are no longer viable in the modern era. If a nation's leaders desire to participate in global economic organizations, receive aid from developmental agencies and promote the political stability of the nation, they must open the political system and integrate mass demands in a sustainable manner.

In order to build a nation in the midst of a fragmented and polarized population, leaders in the developing world must carefully plan out a course of action that will garner the support of the nation, while leading it through difficult transitions. Among the many challenges faced by leadership are defining the nation's goals in the developmental process, providing for articulation of citizen demands, fostering economic growth, encouraging the population to develop a loyalty to the nation and developing the institutions necessary to depersonalize the political process. Clearly, this requires complicated balancing for any leader. Charismatic leadership is of particular interest because often the charismat is able to garner a wide enough base of support to allow him or her to promote specific policies that can either make or break the state.

While it is rare that a charismatic leader is able to delegate power and step down from office after creating the institutions necessary for a viable state, it is possible for the charismat to promote political stability. If the leader of a state seeks to implement a clear vision devoted to the promotion of long-term democratic stability by using his charisma to legitimize the institutions he has created for the people, the charismat can promote the non-coercive political stability required of states in the modern era. The ultimate goal of this analysis is to contribute to the body of knowledge that encompasses the role of leadership in the development of the Third World.

This paper is an abridgement of a larger study of the governmental performance of six charismatic leaders: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, Gamal Abd Al-Nasir of Egypt, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Mao Zedong of China, Josip Tito Broz of the former Yugoslavia, and Sukarno of Indonesia. Systemic analysis

throughout the study focused on differentiation and specialization of institutions, the existence of impartial process and fair and open elections (often outlined in a constitution or organic laws), and the system's ability to aggregate and process domestic demands. Core to building a stable, non-coercive system is the allowance of a relatively free flow of information and ideas within the nation, the overall integration of policies into a system-logic or vision and the existence of non-coercive popular support legitimizing the system. System maintenance was also given particular attention because of its importance in building consensus.

In order for the charismatic leader to succeed in creating a viable system at the end of his rule, there has to be a systematic, visionary push toward political inclusion within the system. If the leader is unable or unwilling to depersonalize the system, he or she has done very little to foster the long-term stability of the state. By examining the various methods they used to either promote democratic inclusion or to pursue power, personal status and wealth, thereby falling victim to the caprices of their own nature to the detriment of their people, I have concluded that all but one of the charismatic leaders examined in this study fell short of fostering democratic stability. Mustafa Ataturk Kemal was able to create not only the trappings of a modern nation-state in Turkey, but provide for the foundations of a democracy through deliberate efforts to incorporate the opposition and provide for fair governmental processes.

Charismatic Leadership and Population Mobilization

The charismatic leader offers a vision of rapid change for his population. Because he is seen as possessing messianic qualities and is a stable point of reference for traditionalized people caught up in a modernizing upheaval, he is able to gain much more support than non-charismatic leaders. As long as an emotional link exists, or as long as "difficulties in communication" characterize the transitional society, the charismatic leader has a much stronger base of legitimacy than the opposition, although they may articulate more effective policy (Pye 30). The leader also projects trustworthiness and undifferentiated calm in a world of chaotic power plays: "Power in the hands of the charismatic leader can be seen as power neutralized, for it is the art of being and not the art of doing that makes him [the leader] what he is" (126). The charismatic leader's skillful rhetoric and messianic qualities legitimize him as a mediator and a friend.

The charismatic leader is a leader perceived by his followers as possessing superhuman or messianic attributes. His legitimacy is derived from the population's perception of him as an embodiment of the nation, harbinger of goodwill, or arbiter of truth. He is able to command a majority of popular support because of an emotional linkage between him and his followers. The charismatic leader can exacerbate cleavages within society through power plays directed at augmenting his own power or he can build the foundations of a consensual state.

According to Dekmejian, the "Routinization" of charisma is by far the most revealing indicator of the ruler's performance. By legitimizing democratic power-sharing and promoting institutionalization of the political process, the charismatic leader can legitimize the institutions he has created, thereby providing for their survival after his demise. Ideally, "routinization" will follow the charismatic leader's acceptance by the masses as a source of unmatched authority: "Clearly, effective routinization is imperative to stabilize an inherently unstable charismatically-conditioned socio-political order" (8). Because the leader uses his charisma to project "messianic" qualities, the people's demands reach "expectations bordering on the miraculous" (8).

While gratification in immediate dividends, such as "dignity" or belonging may delay larger demands upon the system, those demands will eventually become more emphatic. The followers will pursue social, economic and political progress. Participation in a party or movement (and eventually an open political system) must follow in order to stabilize the regime. Charismatic authority must give way to a system "increasingly reliant upon rational-legal means of legitimacy" instead of one rooted in a personalized source of authority. The leader's power should be "depersonalized" within the framework of an efficient bureaucratic system (Dekmejian 8).

What is political stability? In order to understand the role of charismatic leadership in the promotion of political stability, it is important to define this term. Almond and Powell assert that political instability is characterized by "constitutional breakdowns, frequent cabinet changes, demonstrations, and riots" (Almond & Verba 143). One could add military coups and economic crises to the list. While

stability defined simply as “the absence of violent change” in fundamental institutional patterns provides the basis for understanding political stability, this definition must be qualified further.

Stability as a long-term political goal is not simply the repression of opposition. It is a type of stability that fosters lasting order. Stability lies in a government’s deliberate attempts to foster “system capacity” (Almond & Verba 201). For the purpose of this study, political stability, the absence of abrupt and violent changes within the system, will be determined by the system’s ability to adapt and respond to population demands and other sources of “system inputs” in a flexible, effective, and sustainable manner. Guy E. Poitras echoes this sentiment, arguing that political institutions must be capable of withstanding and adapting to system demands: “Demands that outrun the capacity [of governments] to meet them [the demands] hold forth the dark possibility of political decay or chaos” (Poitras 144). Such a situation would be politically unstable.

Palmer argues that dictatorial structures are less amenable to change and thus, less able to adapt to evolving political, economic and social circumstances of both the domestic and international environment. Not only should the system be able to respond to system demands, it should also be able to direct political and social change in a way that benefits the people it governs. According to Lucian W. Pye, stability is more than “stagnation and an arbitrary support of the status quo”. He argues that development should result from a coherent plan of action rather than becoming a response to immediate problems in which the “political process is a hapless victim of social and economic forces that will-nilly control the destiny of the people” (Pye 88).

Visions, Means and Perceived Capabilities

Clearly, the system must be able to direct its resources toward implementing a coherent vision of development. Core to building a stable, non-coercive system in the modern era is the existence of fair and open elections and the system’s ability to aggregate and process domestic demands. The allowance of a relatively free flow of information and ideas within the nation, as demonstrated by the existence of a free press, and the system’s ability to improve the economic conditions of the general populace are also important determinants affecting non-coercive political stability. In a larger version of my paper, I

examined these variables within the framework of the integration of policies into a system-logic or vision that provides for the survival of the system after the charismatic leader's rule (Gibson 32-130).

Such a vision must be promoted by the power elites and built on non-coercive popular support. Charismatic leaders vision often lacks substance because their ultimate goal is not of incorporating the opposition, but by creating a crippling monopoly of power in order to allow the leader to move toward his or her idea of a utopian society. The charismatic leader often becomes so narrowly focused upon his or her visionary goals of a new society, that he or she undercuts the foundations of the nation by ignoring reality. John H. Kautsky argues that "revolutionary modernizers" must be replaced by "managerial modernizers," if a revolution is to translate into successful policy because revolutionary modernizers seldom possess the vision or technical know-how to build a modern nation-state (441-442).

Charismatic leaders, as "revolutionary modernizers," are seldom capable of integrating their vision with the needs of their peoples. According to Henry Kissinger, the "bureaucratic-pragmatic approach" to nation-building is "irrelevant" to the charismatic leader, who is more concerned with promoting an abstract future, grounded not in ideology, but in the leader's own personal magnitude within the system (39).

Kissinger explains further:

Revolutionaries are rarely motivated primarily by material considerations – though the illusion that they are persists in the West. Material incentives do not cause a man to risk his existence and launch himself into the uncertainties of a revolutionary struggle. If Castro or Sukarno had been principally interested in economics, their talents would have guaranteed them brilliant careers in the societies they overthrew. What made their sacrifices worthwhile to them was a vision of the future – or a quest for political power. To revolutionaries the significant reality is the world in which they are striving to bring about, not the world they are fighting to overcome. (Kissinger 39)

The evidence for this assertion is compelling. This is why Nasser and Sukarno failed to act in order to offset the economic crises experienced by their nations until they eventually netted the loss of their rulers' popular mandates to rule; why Mao forced revolutionary conflict upon the Chinese society over and over again. It is also why Castro refuses to give foreign investment a larger role in the country and Nasser allowed his policies of pan-Arab political support take precedence over domestic problems. And this is why Tito, believing nationalism would eventually succumb to Communist ideology, refused to give the republics a larger say in the system until it was too late.

In order to promote his vision of society, he seeks to overhaul the existing order through a revolutionary struggle. Once power is consolidated, the charismat is faced with the challenge of building a stable society and promoting his visionary ideals. Often the charismatic leader finds it difficult to work within the state's means and capabilities. Combating imperialism provides a unifying force for a fragmented population, yet it does not always translate into a viable economic strategy. The leader can chase out the "imperialists," but then he is faced with the loss of the capital necessary to build a viable, politically stable state.

The leader may institute a system of education and socialization that will prepare the population for the benefits of a modernized society, but if the government does not meet increasing demands of economic prosperity, it soon loses its mandate. The charismatic leader is often unable to see beyond his ideological convictions. He becomes a "prophet" instead of a "statesmen," losing hold on reality. While Ataturk's vision identified the means by which he would achieve democratic transition, Mao, Sukarno, Castro, Nasser and Tito found themselves more interested in preserving the purity of their vision, be that a monopoly of power, a Communist utopian society or making their state a Mecca of prosperity and unity in the Arab world, than in identifying the logical means to reach that goal and pursuing them in a realistic way.

Evaluating the Charismat

The charismatic leader has a dynamic understanding of perceived reality, moving toward his vision, often at a high price to his people. Nasser promised Egypt social justice and world recognition (Stephenson 18). Yet Nasser's belief that he was called to lead the Arab world would supersede loyalty to his own country. Nasser describes three concentric circles of consciousness, loyalty and unity: The First Circle, comprising the African Continent the Second Circle made up of the Moslem World and the Last Circle, comprising Egypt the Homeland, (Abdel-Nasser 67-68). In Nasser's opinion, the first two circles were integral to the survival of the Egyptian people and he, as leader of Africa and the Arab world, would pursue an involved internationalist policy, extending the country's resources and capacities far beyond its capabilities (i.e. the Six Day War of 1967). Nasser would search for "solutions to real problems by stepping outside of their parameters" (Waterbury 48).

Waterbury argues that in Nasser's eyes, the real threat to Egypt's and the rest of the Arab World's prosperity and security was the imperial menace, which would not allow the Revolution to proceed because it remained too threatening to imperialist interests. Only when the imperialist threat had been defeated, could the Revolution really move toward its goals (however abstract) (48). Waterbury asserts that Egypt's leaders have traditionally sought solutions to domestic problems by linking them to the external world in an ineffective way: "beyond a vague aspiration toward industrialization and modernity, policy formation tended to be dictated by real and perceived threats to the regime and not as part of a coherent economic strategy"(49). The charismatic leader often becomes so narrowly focused upon his visionary goals of a new society, that he or she undercuts the foundations of the nation by ignoring reality.

Mao and the Communists garnered great support amongst the exploited Chinese masses, which found their creed of social justice very attractive. Mao promised the Chinese an egalitarian society based on brotherhood and freedom. Yet he was unable to provide either because of his own limited vision. Mao's understanding of the world was based on inherent, violent conflict. Mao once wrote, "War is Politics. Politics is war by other means" (Short 17). Mao's initial successes were destroyed by his own inability to see past dynamic upheavals of society as a way to perpetuate the revolution. The brutal Cultural Revolution and disastrous Hundred Flowers Campaign would purge intellectuals and elites whose loyalty Mao suspected. Mao believed that ideological purity was the most important element in the development equation. He, like Nasser, placed his own ideological beliefs above the welfare of his people.

Reality was less important to Mao than achieving the ideal Communist society. As MacGregor Burns aptly puts it: "Mao periodically went into battle with his own creation" (120), severely undermining the performance of the institutional structures he had created. Mao became so preoccupied with preserving the revolutionary vision, that he ignored the needs of the people. When Mao attacked the bureaucracy during the Cultural Revolution, he destroyed the state statistical system, which had been used to optimize developmental strategy. Mao was excellent in mobilization, but he knew very little about economics (Lieberthal 98-97). Mao was inclined to concern himself with maintaining ideological purity against "revisionist capitalists." He delegated the management of the state to his premier, Zhou Enlai. While Mao dominated the Chinese government and party by sheer "force of intellect," Enlai took hold of the reigns of

the administration of the bureaucracy, military and economy. Enlai became the “pragmatic doer,” and Mao “the abstract thinker” (Roskin 361).

Fidel Castro, as Montaner asserts, was also more a “revolutionary” than a statesman (21). Castro promised the people a life free from imperial domination, which he blamed, and continues to blame, for Cuba’s economic and social problems. After it received independence from Spain in 1898, Cuba inherited a system of elite exploitation of the masses. American companies dominated the Cuban economy and the white elitist class controlled the majority of capital and management (Leonard 202).

Castro envisioned a world where the wealth accumulated by the rich would be distributed to the poor and he nationalized the company holdings of private citizens. (Leonard 202-204). The state, as represented by “fair-minded revolutionaries,” would seek to harness that wealth in state enterprises designed to benefit all (Montaner 120). While great strides were made in health care, education, the economic policies of the regime undercut many of its achievements augmenting the population’s standard of living (Leonard 208). Castro and his close associates saw development as a “zero-sum game” and believed that all wealthy nations had built their wealth not by ingenuity, but by taking it from the poor (Montaner 120). He would expel foreign industry from Cuba and pursue nationalization, inciting Eisenhower’s economic embargo (Leonard 209). Development, as a zero-sum game, gave the regime impetus to pursue an anti-imperialist policy against the U.S.

Sukarno also offered the Indonesian society freedom from imperialist domination. After expelling the Dutch, he pursued a rabidly anti-imperialistic foreign policy. He was able to promote Guided Democracy by discrediting Western majoritarian rule to his people, arguing that it dominated and suppressed minorities (Tarling 13). He found it easy to become the unifying father of all the people, slipping into the identity of a national savior or identifying himself with the heros of traditional Javanese shadow puppetry (Willner 5).

By far, Sukarno’s greatest legacy was a vision of an inclusive national identity for the Indonesian people, which transcended race, religion or economic class (Adams 279). “Bung Karno” called for unity among the variety of peoples that inhabited the 17,500 islands of Indonesia, where an estimated 584 languages and dialects are spoken, and Christians and Hindus share the island with its Islamic majority (Europa 1978). Yet, like Mao, Castro and Nasser, Sukarno found anti-imperialist dogma more important

than facing the economic problems of Indonesia. His popular mandate would be revoked because of that failure (Tarling 44).

Ignoring the reality of the nation's problems is not the only typically common denominator among charismatic leadership. Refusal to relinquish power is often characteristic of the charismatic leader because, as Kissinger has stated, the charismatic sees himself as the integral, indispensable hub of the wheel that keeps the system turning. Sukarno's refusal accommodate to the demands for power-sharing contributed to the loss of support for him among both the elites and the masses (Malik 295).

Tito was also unable to act within his countries means in order to achieve his goals. Many consider even Stalin to be more practical than Tito, whose ideology overpowered nation-building considerations. Tito sought to move out of the Soviet sphere of domination by allowing greater economic freedom and institution worker's councils during the reform period of the 1960's (Campbell 1052). The economic freedom would be undercut by extreme decentralization of the 1960's. His commitment to remaining ideologically pure to his version of the Communist ideology led him to purge close associates like Milovan Djilas.

At the same time, Tito balked at the thought of giving up his own monopoly of power, inserting a clause into the 1974 Constitution that allowed him to dominate the system until his death (Pavlowitch 67). While he promised unity, he practiced division and while he preached freedom, he practiced suppression. Though Tito made great strides in modernizing Yugoslavia, he was unable to provide for non-coercive political stability because he could not see beyond his own monopoly of power to a larger vision of true democratic unity.

Finally the 20th century Turkish leader, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk or "Father Turk" came to power with a clear strategy for building a Turkish nation from the shambles of the Ottoman Empire. The components of his strategy are espoused in the six principles of the Republican People's Party: nationalism, secularism, populism, republicanism, revolution and state socialism in 1931 (Cooper 116). Lawlor asserts that Ataturk believed that "he and only he could make it [Turkey] prosper. Ataturk once said, "I am Turkey," sounding much like Louis XIV (Lawlor 122). Yet he pursued a vision of liberating his people from religious fundamentalism and dogmatic ideologies, ushering it into the modern period, with all its trappings.

As Mango asserts, Ataturk was a true product of the European Enlightenment, “Ataturk’s message is that East and West can meet on the ground of universal secular values and mutual respect, that nationalism is compatible with peace, that human reason is the only true guide in life” (Fromkin 19). Ataturk proposed to guide his people to democracy and he meant what he said: “I will lead my people by the hand until their feet are sure and they know the way. Then they can choose for themselves. Then, my work will be done” (Weiker ii).

In truth, Ataturk understood that if his people were to compete in the modern world, their state must become modernized and democratic. Ataturk once became incensed to learn that the popular German historian, Emil Ludwig, had characterized the modernizing stalwart as a dictator. His response was to form the Free Republican Party, asserting, “I do not want to be recorded in history as a man who bequeathed tyranny” (Mango 471-472). Because instituting a governmental system that would survive his own rule was a primary goal of Ataturk’s rule, he was able to make progress in stability and democracy, where other charismatic rulers fell short.

Ataturk changed not only how the state was run, but more importantly how the people viewed that state, how the state should be held accountable to its people and how democracy offered the best solution to that dilemma. Weiker characterizes Turkey’s transition to democratic rule by two phases: “rigid single party rule, 1923-1930” and “flexible single party rule, 1931-1946” (262). While power was consolidated in the former, the latter period was characterized by attempts to inculcate the leaders with democratic principles. The party and the government agencies were made accountable to the population through advancement restrictions when they performed badly and improvements were made in the economy (262-63). As Duverger asserts the single party model (specifically the mass party model as opposed to the elite vanguardist model, see Gibson, pg 47) can be used to foster a sense of national identity in a population and serve as a transitional mechanism for multi-party politics (278).

On December 6, 1922, Ataturk announced the formation of the Republican People’s Party and “invited educated classes of the country to communicate their views directly to him” (Lewis 259). Characterized by open membership and an absence of purges, the Republican People’s party would become a mass party organization that would foster the political education of the masses and encourage the controlled growth of the opposition movement (Duverger 278). Ataturk encouraged experimentation with

the opposition, most notably with the Free Party of 1930. Though this experiment met with particular frustration, Ataturk remained committed both through speech and action that Turkey should and would become a democratic society (Weiker 294). The Turkish leader demonstrated an enlightened impartiality during the elections between the two warring parties (Weiker 135), setting an example to the people of the importance of cooperative power-sharing in the government. The failure of the first free elections in Turkey were characterized by open hostility and the subversive tactics of the RPP (138).

Such disasters revealed to a disappointed Ataturk the fragility of Turkish national unity (Weiker 151). Ataturk sought to increase political reform and deliberately to incorporate the opposition within the single party framework of a “reformed RPP,” thereby promoting “the development of an ideological framework within which multi-party politics could function in a moderate and controlled way” (294). Such reforms included the establishment of nationwide “people’s houses” (halkevi) and “people’s rooms” (halkodasi) as “political and cultural centers” (Findley and Rothney 201) and “public meetings, people’s congresses and conferences in order to promote political socialization among the masses (Duverger 278).

Duverger describes the success of Turkey’s transition from a single party model to multiparty politics as resting on tolerance and incorporation of the opposition: “there seems to have been a quite well-developed democratic spirit inside the party. Officially, all the leaders were elected; in practice the elections seem scarcely to have been any more manipulated than inside parties in pluralist systems” (278). This type of skillful balancing allowed Ataturk’s prime minister and successor who served as the country’s leader 12 years after Ataturk’s death (Lawlor 120) Ismet Inono, to supervise the formation of a second party, the Democratic Peoples Party in 1945 (Findley and Rothney 201) led by Celal Bayar (Duverger 278). Ataturk was able to foster a slow transition from single party to multiparty politics through tolerance and encouragement of the opposition under the single party mantle.

Development is not a linear process and experiences many setbacks. Though Ataturk insisted that the military should stay out of politics (Fromkin 19), by its own volition, the military has come to see itself as a guardian of General Kemal’s revolution. Ideally, the military should be solely concerned with the protection of state borders, but a military committed to democratic rule might have initially provided the only check on the power-thirsty rulers that sought to dominate the state after Ataturk’s death. Ultimately, however, the military, by invading the political sphere through actual coups or intimidation, has detracted

from the stability of the state. Both the civilian government and the military need to work to reestablish the armed forces' apolitical role as originally propagated by Turkey's founding father. Still, Ataturk's legacy survives. If viewed with an appreciation of his attempt to remain a dynamic force in the Middle East, the changing international environment and moral order, can still usher Turkey fully into the modern era. Ataturk laid the foundations for democracy and sought to create a stable state. It is up to Turkey's leadership to follow through with the "spirit", and not "the letter" of that mandate ("Ataturk's Long Shadow" 3).

The charismatic leader offers a vision of rapid change for his population. In order to promote his vision of society, he seeks to overhaul the existing order through a revolutionary struggle. Once power is consolidated, the charismat is faced with the challenge of building a stable society and promoting his visionary ideals. Often the charismatic leader finds it difficult to work within the state's means and capabilities. Combating imperialism provides a unifying force for a fragmented population, yet it does not always translate into a viable economic strategy. The leader can chase out the "imperialists," but then he is faced with the loss of the capital necessary to build a viable, politically stable state.

The leader may institute a system of education and socialization that will prepare the population for the benefits of a modernized society, but if the government does not meet increasing demands of economic prosperity, it soon loses its mandate. The charismatic leader is often unable to see beyond his ideological convictions. He becomes a "prophet" instead of a "statesmen," losing hold on reality. While Ataturk's vision identified the means by which he would achieve democratic transition, Mao, Sukarno, Castro, Nasser and Tito found themselves more interested in preserving the purity of their vision, be that a monopoly of power, a Communist utopian society or making their state a Mecca of prosperity and unity in the Arab world, than in identifying the logical means to reach that goal and pursuing them in a realistic way.

Conclusion

Most charismatic leaders find it difficult to loosen their hold on power once that power has been legitimized by the popular support that results from the charismatic relationship. Mao's and Tito's ideologies precluded the power-sharing and systemic checks and balances necessary for a truly stable system. Sukarno and Nasser found it difficult to grant any real power to the institutions they had created or

pave the way for true democratic stability. These leaders came to personify Kissinger's prophet, bent on realizing their own reality at the expense of their citizenry. The results for the nations involved were often devastating.

China's leaders have worked for more than 30 years to counter the effects of Mao's disastrous experiments, initiated in the pursuit of ideological purity. The Chinese system is still inherently unstable because it stands on the shoulders of a few elite men. Tito's state is now a hodge-podge of economically and socially devastated fledgling states. Though Slovenia and Croatia have made economic progress, that progress certainly has little to do with Tito's policies. Though there is no guarantee that cooperation could have been sustained within the former Yugoslavia, Tito's policies certainly did not create the vision of "Unity and Brotherhood" he espoused for the country. His inability to provide for unity, because of his "divide and conqueror" techniques of suppression and ethnic purging helped create an environment where cooperation became unviable. By concentrating power in his hands alone, he further weakened the ability of the nationalities to cooperate. After waging war on the nationalities, elaborate decentralization could do little but spur the regional conflicts Tito had tried so hard to suppress.

Castro continues to dominate the Cuban political system and there is no hope for any substantial change in his present policies of mass suppression. Instability will be the buzzword when Castro kicks the bucket. In all likelihood, Raul will continue his brother's legacy. The biggest hope for change is a military coup. Castro has done very little to promote the long-term stability of the state.

Sukarno's inattention to the practicalities of economy, his penchant for favoring the PKI over all other parties, and his light treatment of state institutions as mere tentacles of his Guided Democracy did little to "routinize" his charisma. While he established a system based on mass participation, he refused to give it any power. His legacy became manifested in 33 years of military rule, a plethora of regionalism and factionalism exacerbated by his penchant for pitting the army against the communists, banning the socialist and Muslim parties and economic catastrophe, which is all currently bequeathed to his own daughter, Megawatti Sukarnoputri.

With no clear vision, Nasser and the Free Officers stepped onto the scene, unprepared for nation-building. Nasser created the ASU in order to galvanize the masses and preempt factionalism. His adventurous foreign policy netted a decline in both his charisma and in his own ability to rule. By devoting

his energies to the Arab world, Nasser, as the prophet, divested his country of needed funds that could have been used to develop the economy. He poured limited funds into the bureaucratic “black hole,” and sent Egyptians to fight in faraway conflicts as their state crumbled before them. By the time, he realized it was necessary to attempt to legitimize the institutions he had created, his own health was in decline and the people’s faith in him in great decline. He would bequeath a legacy of dictatorship that still characterizes Egypt today.

Only Ataturk was able to pave the way for long-term, non-coercive political stability by making it a primary goal. Though the Turkish political system has faced setbacks, if the current leadership (both military and civilian) works together to send the military back to the barracks and galvanizes dynamic and judicious civilian leadership for the purposes of the state, Turkey can continue to capitalize on the reforms made by Ataturk. By moving in the “spirit” of the revolution and not the “letter” of Ataturk’s philosophy, the Turkish state can work toward greater inclusion by seeking a less extreme approach to secularism and the Kurdish problem. Ataturk wanted Turkey to be a modern state able to compete with the West – only by moving within that framework can Turkey achieve greater democracy and economic prosperity.

In developing nations, leadership has voiced its commitment to building the modern institutions required to participate in the global economic system. Incentives for modernization include creating a viable political order in the face of mass mobilization. Democracy and the free market economy rarely flourish in the traditional societies of the Third World. Charismatic leadership can unite the divided populations of the Third World and encourage its transition into the modern era. However, the majority of charismatic leaders do very little to create a modern, stable framework because charismatic leadership personalizes power. Most leaders shrink from the task of depersonalizing power by strengthening institutions that could survive his rule. Because charismatic leadership is problematic due to the fact that it inherently personalizes power, it often does little to foster political development. At the same time, democracy has yet to flourish, or even survive, in transitional political cultures without some type of transitional, unifying leadership led by visionary purpose (e.g. Nehru in India and Mandela in S. Africa).

While charismatic leadership most often succumbs to the caprices of power, it is possible for the charismat to bequeath his state the legitimate institutions and mass mobilization necessary for non-coercive political stability. By moving to buttress the institutions he had created with his own charisma, Ataturk

legitimized a system that would provide the foundations necessary for long-term stability. Charismatic leadership, if imbued with vision and purpose and dedicated to the pursuit of a truly democratic society, can lead a state toward greater political stability.

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